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I
n 1998, the federal government recorded its first
budget surplus in more than 25 years. Now, after
an extended period of deficits and three consecu-
tive years of surpluses, both the White House Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) have projected annual
budget surpluses for at least the next decade. The
turnaround in the outlook for the U.S. government’s
finances is stunning. Under current policies, budget
projections show that publicly held government
debt, which is currently a little more than $3.5
trillion, will be eliminated by around 2010—perhaps
earlier if the economy continues to grow faster than
anticipated.1 The political response to these
projections has been rapid. Despite legislated
budgetary “caps,” fiscal policymakers have already
increased spending and reduced taxes relative to pre-
vious agreements.
Projected large government surpluses have impli-
cations for the current political debate—possibly
even the future implementation of monetary policy.2
The purpose of this article is to assess the likelihood
that the projected surpluses will materialize by com-
paring previous budget projections with actual out-
comes. No one can say for sure whether these pro-
jected surpluses will materialize or whether publicly
held government debt will be eliminated. If past ex-
perience is any guide, however, it seems likely that
the market in default risk–free government debt will
be with us for some time. Policymakers, accordingly,
might be wise to consider this fact before deciding to
ramp up spending or cut taxes solely on the basis of
current projections.
The first section of the paper reviews the current
budget projections of the CBO and the OMB; it also
reviews government budget accounting practices and
discusses whether government debt is rising or
falling. As a means of ascertaining the probability that
the current projected surpluses will materialize, the
second section analyzes the CBO’s projections since
1976 relative to actual outcomes. The third section of
the paper analyzes the major sources of error in these
projections. The conclusions are presented in the
fourth section.
CURRENT BUDGET PROJECTIONS
Table 1 presents the 10-year budget projections
and major economic assumptions published by the
CBO and the OMB in 2000. The projection period is
fiscal years 2001 to 2010. There are two sets of pro-
jections because each agency publishes a major
report early in the year and then during the summer.
One other fact worth noting is the approach taken
by each agency. Generally speaking, CBO baseline
budget projections follow the current services
approach, which assumes that the current spending
and tax programs remain in place throughout the
projection period—though the CBO, at least in recent
years, has typically published alternative projections
using different spending assumptions. The OMB also
publishes a current services (baseline) projection, as
well as a projection that traces out the path of the
surplus or deficit over time assuming that the
Administration’s specific policy proposals are enact-
ed. We label the former OMB and the latter OMB*.
According to the January 2000 budget projec-
tions shown in Table 1, the CBO projected that the
unified budget surplus (the sum of “on budget” and
“off budget” revenues and expenses) will rise from
$177 billion in fiscal year 2001 to just under $489
billion by fiscal year 2010.3 Cumulatively, the 10-
1 Authors’ note: This article was prepared prior to the publication of
the projections for FY 2002-10 by the CBO and OMB. See Appendix.
2  The prospect of eliminating publicly held federal debt poses a po-
tential problem for the Fed. Historically, the Fed has implemented
monetary policy by buying and selling government securities (open
market operations). Because the public’s demand for money tends
to rise with nominal GDP, over time, the Fed buys more government
securities than it sells to increase the supply of money. If the public
debt were eliminated, the Fed would be unable to acquire addition-
al government debt. Moreover, it would have to replace its holdings
of government debt with something else. The question is what?
3 Off-budget includes Social Security and the U.S. Post Office. On-
budget is everything else—including other trust funds. This base-
line—one of three published by CBO—assumes that discretionary
spending grows at the rate of inflation after FY 2000. Because this
projection assumes considerably greater discretionary spending lev-
els, it produces the smallest cumulative surplus over the forecast
horizon. Specifically, it presumes that the discretionary budget caps
that are set to expire in 2002 will not be adhered to. Most budget
analysts use this baseline projection.
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year unified budget surplus was expected to sum to
just under $3.2 trillion. Although the Administration
expected a somewhat smaller cumulative surplus
because of the President’s budget proposals, roughly
$2.5 trillion (OMB*), its cumulative current services
projection (OMB) was fairly close to the CBO’s.
These projections are not only large in dollar
terms, but, if realized, would be historically large as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Figure 1
shows the U.S. annual surplus/deficit as a percent of
GNP/GDP since 1800 and the projections to 2010.
There is no prior multiyear period when the actual
surplus was as persistently large as the CBO’s current
projections. Prior to 1970 the only multiyear periods
of protracted deficits were associated with wars.
Since these projections were made, the U.S. fiscal
outlook has improved even further according to the
mid-year updates. As seen in Table 1, the CBO and
OMB have increased substantially their cumulative
10-year budget surplus projections. The CBO’s
Budget and Economic Update released in July 2000
projects a cumulative $4.6 trillion surplus. In up-
dated projections published in its Mid-Session Review
released in late June 2000, the Administration’s pro-
jected 10-year surplus (OMB*) was increased from
$2.5 trillion to $2.9 trillion. The biggest surprise was
the Administration’s sharply higher projection of the
10-year current services surplus. Using slightly more
optimistic economic assumptions, the OMB later
estimated that the unified budget surplus will total
$4.2 trillion over the 2001-10 period, which is more
than 40 percent, or $1.3 trillion, greater than the
February 2000 current services baseline. Revised
economic assumptions account for $984 billion, or
more than 75 percent, of this $1.3 trillion upward
revision.4
Basic Budget Accounting: Is the Govern-
ment Debt Rising or Falling?
One can think of the government debt as being
the sum of all surpluses and deficits during U.S. his-
tory. In the very long run this is approximately true.
In any given year, however, when the government
4 Specifically, real GDP growth averages about one quarter of a per-
centage point more a year. Technical reestimates account for anoth-
er $375 billion of the total upward revision, roughly split equally
between increased receipts and lower expenditures. See OMB (2000)
Tables 5, 8, and 9. Finally, legislation enacted since February 2000 is
expected to decrease the projected surplus by $84 billion over this
10-year horizon.
OMB/CBO Unified Surplus Baseline Projections and Economic Assumptions
Surplus/deficit projections (billions of dollars) Economic assumptions (fiscal year)
2001 2010 Cumulative Real GDP Inflation 10-Year bond
CBO (January 2000) 177  489 3,152 2.77 2.49 5.84
CBO (July 2000) 268  685 4,561 2.79 2.60 5.90
OMB* (February 2000) 184  363 2,519 2.71 2.59 6.10
OMB 171 457 2,919 2.71 2.59 6.10
OMB* (June 2000) 228 416 2,912 2.93 2.60 6.30
OMB 239 670 4,193 2.93 2.60 6.30
NOTE: Growth of real GDP, inflation, and the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond rate are averages of annual forecasts/projections. CBO and
OMB projections use the CPI inflation rate. OMB is the Administration’s current services projection.
Table 1
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runs a deficit, it can borrow from the public or
change its holdings of cash or other assets.5 Conver-
sely, when the government runs a surplus, it can
retire its debt or increase its holdings of cash or
other assets. Consequently, over any given period,
government debt will not necessarily change dollar-
for-dollar with the surplus or deficit.
To further complicate matters, whether the debt
changes or not depends on where in the govern-
ment the surplus or deficit is generated. Within the
government there are a number of trust funds, the
best known of which is the federal Old-Age and Sur-
vivors Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust fund—
Social Security. When a surplus is generated within
the trust fund, the government issues nonmarketable
interest-bearing debt to the trust fund. This is essen-
tially an IOU that one area of government issues to
another. Likewise, when a trust fund runs a deficit,
the government must buy back the nonmarketable
debt using surpluses from elsewhere (should they
exist), borrow from the public, or raise taxes.6
In the government accounts, revenues and
expenditures are thus classified as either federal
funds or trust funds. Trust fund revenues are
earmarked for a specific program or purpose, such
as OASDI or federal road, bridge, and highway
construction (highway trust fund). If the government
runs a surplus in both its federal and trust funds
accounts, total debt will fall.7 If the government runs
a surplus in only one of its accounts, total debt need
not fall. For example, in fiscal year (FY) 1999 the fed-
eral government’s $124.4 billion budget surplus was
the result of a $88.3 billion deficit in the federal
Table M Velocity Estimates
Government Accounting with Trust Fund Surpluses (Billions of Dollars)
Fiscal year 1998 Fiscal year 1999 Change 1998-99
Debt outstanding
Total government securities  5,478.7 5,606.1 127.4
Less:
Securities held by government accounts 1,757.1 1,973.2 216.1
Equals:
Government securities held by the public 3,721.6 3,632.9 –88.7*
Sources of financing
Unified surplus, FY 1999 124.4
Borrowing from the public –88.7*
Operating cash, change –17.6
Other –18.2
Surplus/deficit (–)
Federal funds –92.0 –88.3 3.7
Trust funds 161.2 212.7 51.5
Total unified surplus/deficit 69.2 124.4 55.2
Memorandum
Treasury cash balance, end of FY 1999 56.5
NOTE: Includes debt issued by government agencies. Value of debt outstanding is the face value less the net unamortized premium and
discount, otherwise known as the accrual amount. Totals may not sum because of rounding. *Identical values calculated by two separate
methods.
SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Tables 1.4 and 7.1; Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Reserve
Bulletin, November 2000, Table 1.38.
Table 2
5 The other assets include such things as special drawing rights
(SDRs), allocations of SDRs, the reserve position in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), loans to the IMF, changes in the gold stock,
etc. See Rasche (1980) for more details.
6 The accounting is more complicated because the interest income
from the nonmarketable debt issued to trusts is accumulated in a
separate account. Consequently, the government does not have to
buy back the debt issued to the trusts until the accumulated inter-
est income in these accounts is exhausted. This interest “income,”
however, is a mere intragovernment bookkeeping entry, since it
cannot be used to offset expenditures elsewhere. In other words,
because budget accounts measure transactions with the public,
even though the trust funds may credit the government with inter-
est income from nonmarketable debt, the reported unified budget
is unaffected.
7 This is the general case. It is also possible to accumulate other
assets with the surplus or decide to hold increased cash balances.14 MARCH/APRIL 2001
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funds account—mostly individual and corporate
income tax revenues used to fund, for example,
defense outlays or international aid programs—and
a $212.7 billion surplus in the trust funds account.8
As detailed in Table 2, the net government surplus
was thus $124 billion, of which nearly $89 billion
was used to retire government debt held by the
public. Hence, publicly held government debt fell
while total government debt rose.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of total (gross) fed-
eral debt, publicly held government debt, and
nonmarketable debt since 1960, along with the
CBO’s projections through 2010. Despite cumulative
budget surpluses of nearly $200 billion in fiscal
years 1998 and 1999, gross federal indebtedness
rose by nearly $130 billion. The reason, of course, is
that the government issued nonmarketable debt to
trust funds equal to their surpluses during this
period. The largest of these is the OASDI fund, which
“held” $855 billion in government debt at the end of
FY 1999. Another $1.15 trillion was held by other
trust funds, such as the federal employees’
retirement fund ($474.7 billion) and the hospital
insurance portion of Medicare ($153.8 billion).
The practice of issuing nonmarketable debt to
trust funds was motivated by a desire to assure the
public that the benefits that have been promised
under specific programs will be forthcoming. Unlike
private sector accounting rules, which mandate that
firms fund their pension-plan benefits on an accrual
basis, the federal government is not required to hold
sufficient assets to compensate future beneficiaries
their accrued benefits. The reason, of course, is that
the government can, if necessary, raise taxes by the
amount necessary to pay existing retirees—tax
future workers to pay today’s workers’ retirement
benefits. Alternatively, the government could borrow
from the public when Social Security program pay-
ments exceeded payroll tax revenues, as it did
frequently prior to 1983.9
Given that there was no explicit commitment to
either raise taxes or borrow from the public, how-
ever, some feared that the government might instead
renege on its commitment to Social Security recipi-
ents by reducing program benefits when the OASDI
program began to run persistent deficits. Conse-
quently, Congress attempted to tie its own hands by
issuing nonmarketable, interest-bearing debt to the
Social Security Administration in the amount of the
Social Security surplus—the so-called Social Security
“Lock Box.”
The “Gray” Area of Future Budgets
Although publicly held debt is currently declin-
ing and may decline further, it is unlikely that public
debt will stay at zero very long, should it ever get
there. The reason is demographics. Recent genera-
tional accounting by Gokhale et al. (2000) suggests
that the net tax liabilities of future generations will
increase significantly because of the pending retire-
ment of the baby boom generation. Likewise,
according to the 2000 Social Security Trustees
Annual Report, program expenses are projected to
exceed payroll tax revenue beginning in 2016. 
The federal government’s unfunded liability of
the Social Security program measured on an accrual
basis was about $10.4 trillion in 1999 according to
congressional testimony by CBO Director Dan
Crippen. This is more than 12 times larger than the
$855 billion in nonmarketable debt held by the
OASDI trust fund in FY 1999. Consequently, it seems
unlikely that the government will be able to meet its
future obligations without borrowing from the pub-
lic. In other words, at some point, publicly held debt
Gross Federal Debt and Federal Debt
Held by the Public

















8 This accounting is a little misleading because the surpluses in
some trusts are due to intragovernmental transfers from the gener-
al funds to these trust funds. Much of these transfers are the direct
consequence of the trust funds holding interest-bearing govern-
ment debt. See CBO (2000a, pp. 22-23) for additional details.
9 Since the 1983 Social Security reforms (Greenspan Commission),
payroll tax revenues collected by the government to finance OASDI
benefits have exceeded program payments to recipients by a little
more than $50 billion a year, while the surplus for all federal trust
funds averaged a little more than $100 billion a year.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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will inexorably rise.
Indeed, projections published in the CBO’s latest
Long-Term Budget Outlook indicate such a scenario:
Even if Congress and the Administration manage to
wall off all of the projected (cumulative) $2.4 trillion
off-budget surplus during the next decade in a “lock
box,” the debt held by the public will rise to a little
more than 62 percent of GDP by 2040, compared
with about 40 percent in 1999. Further simulations
project that the share of the debt held by the public
would rise to 184 percent of GDP by 2040 if there
were no annual surpluses during the next 10 years.
Accordingly, unless there is a surplus elsewhere in
government to offset the Social Security deficit, the
government will have to make up the shortfall by
raising taxes, reducing benefits, and/or issuing mar-
ketable debt.10 If the last option is used, publicly held
debt will rise as the trust funds’ holdings of debt
decline.
PAST PROJECTIONS AND ACTUAL
EXPERIENCE
Will publicly held government debt go to zero?
Not if the current projected surpluses don’t material-
ize.11 Given the relative magnitude of the current
surplus projections and the speed with which earlier
CBO projections shifted from deficit to surplus, per-
haps it is not surprising that nearly 60 percent of the
respondents in a recent survey of business econo-
mists (conducted by the National Association for
Business Economics) indicated that the CBO’s bud-
get projections are too optimistic. Only 31 percent of
the respondents believed that the projections were
reasonable.12 It is not just economists who are skep-
tical of official budget projections. A survey by the
Business Council suggests similar skepticism among
chief executive officers of major U.S. corporations.13
Some insight into the accuracy of budget projec-
tions can be obtained by evaluating the CBO’s past
projections. We focus on the CBO’s projections be-
cause the CBO is viewed as an impartial arbiter of the
federal government’s fiscal outlook. The budget pro-
jection process was not intended as a forecasting ex-
ercise. It was created to provide a method of analyz-
ing alternative budget proposals. Nevertheless, the
public and policymakers frequently treat these pro-
jections as forecasts, suggesting—or implementing—
changes in spending or taxes based on them.
It is important to note, however, that this exercise
is biased against the CBO for a couple of reasons.
First, many of the rules employed to calculate the
baseline budget projection are set by statute. Conse-
quently, the CBO is forced to construct its baseline
projections under these assumptions, regardless of
whether CBO believes they are realistic. For example,
the Deficit Control Act of 1985 mandates that the
CBO project the future discretionary spending levels
from current-year appropriations, whether the
current-year appropriations are unusually high or
low due to special appropriations (e.g., Desert Storm).
The second reason, which is related to the first,
stems from the difference between budget projec-
tions and forecasts. Baseline budget projections are
based on the current services approach, that is, the
assumption that the government will leave its
current tax and spending programs in place.14  This
is highly unlikely, so budget projections are almost
assuredly going to be wrong. For example, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993,
which sought to produce markedly lower future
deficits in relation to earlier projected deficits, pro-
duced budget projections markedly different from
those of the previous baseline. As described later, the
CBO estimates that about one third of its projection
error is legislative, i.e., due to changes in tax and
spending programs that were assumed to be
constant for the purpose of making the projections.
Despite the difficult nature of projecting future fiscal
outcomes, it is nonetheless instructive to analyze the
CBO’s past budget projections.
The CBO began publishing five-year budget pro-
jections in January 1976 for FY 1977-81. Figures 3
through 5 present the actual one-year, five-year, and
cumulative five-year projected surplus/deficit annu-
ally for the period 1976-99. If the CBO’s past
projections coincided with what subsequently tran-
spired—that is, a zero projection error—then all of
the points would lie on the 45-degree line. While few
observations fall on the 45-degree line, at the one-
10 Social Security actuaries estimate that the Trust Fund will exhaust
its holdings of nonmarketable government debt by about 2037. The
extended period reflects the interest “income” that is annually cred-
ited to the trust fund. See footnote 7.
11 See Auerbach (2000) and the other papers published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (2000) for discussion of this and other
issues.
12 See National Association for Business Economics (2000).
13 See Weill (2000).
14 In making their current services projections, the CBO and OMB each
assume a path for several key economic variables and then calculate
the path of outlays and receipts under the assumption that tax rates
and spending programs will not change over the projection period.
Tax rates and spending programs—other than automatic stabilizers
such as income support programs for the unemployed—do not vary
with forecasts of the economy, nor does a policy change endoge-
nously alter the path of the key economic variables. As discussed by
Rasche (1985), this is different from a model-based forecast, such as
those used by most forecasters.16 MARCH/APRIL 2001
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year horizon they are about equally spaced above
and below the line, suggesting that the projections
are approximately accurate on average. In other
words, at the one-year horizon, the average projec-
tion error is not too far from zero. More important, at
the one-year horizon there is a positive relationship
between the projections and the actual outcome.
Hence, if the CBO projected that the surplus would
increase the next year, there was a tendency for the
actual surplus to increase.
At the five-year horizon, outcomes are quite dif-
ferent. Figure 4 reveals that there is no relationship
between the CBO’s projections and the actual
surplus/deficit. Not only do none of the observations
fall on the 45-degree line, but a large deficit was as
likely to occur when the CBO projected a surplus as
it was when the CBO projected a deficit. At the five-
year horizon, the CBO’s projections have not been a
useful indicator of what the future is likely to entail.
The CBO’s cumulative five-year projections are
more important for the question of whether publicly
held government debt will be eliminated. Figure 5
shows that the CBO’s cumulative projections have
frequently missed their mark. In some cases, the
projection errors are very large. For example, in 1980
the CBO projected a $578 billion cumulative surplus
over the next five years. The actual outcome, how-
ever, was a deficit of a little more than $800 billion.
If past experience is a guide to the future, the CBO’s
current projection of a cumulative surplus of a little
more than $4.5 trillion dollars should not be treated
as a forecast that can be relied on. The government is
as likely to experience a deficit as it is to experience
a surplus.
The general impression obtained from Figures 3
through 5 is summarized numerically in Table 3,
which presents summary statistics for the CBO’s pro-
jection errors (projected less actual) at the one-year
and five-year horizons for the surplus/deficit, outlays,
and receipts. To make the comparisons more useful,
the projection errors are presented as a percentage of
nominal GDP. At the one-year horizon, the mean
absolute error (MAE) is about 1 percent of GDP. The
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root-mean-squared error (RMSE) is slightly larger at
1.3 percent of GDP, and the range is about 5.2
percent of GDP.
How large are these numbers? One way to put
these numbers into perspective is to note that the
average deficit during the 1976-99 period was 3.0
percent of GDP. Hence, at the one-year horizon, the
MAE is about one third of the average deficit. More-
over, actual surpluses and deficits ranged from –6.0
percent of GDP to 1.4 percent of GDP, so the range of
projection errors was about 70 percent of the range
of actual surpluses/deficits over the period (5.2 per-
cent/7.4 percent, respectively). Hence, even at the
one-year horizon, the projection errors are relatively
large.
At the five-year horizon, the MAE is more than
4 percent of GDP and the RMSE is nearly 5.3 percent
of GDP. As measured by the RMSE, the projection er-
rors are nearly twice the actual average deficit over
the period. This means that the probability is high
that the error in the five-year projection would be
larger than the largest single-year deficit as a percent
of GDP, 6.0 percent. Furthermore, the range of pro-
jection errors is over 17 percent of GDP. This is more
than double the range of the actual surplus/deficit as
a percent of GDP during the 1976-99 period.
Table 3 also shows that the CBO’s projections of
future revenues are somewhat less accurate than its
projections of outlays. Perhaps this is not surprising
given the sensitivity of tax revenues to economic
conditions. At the one-year horizon, the RMSE for
total receipts is nearly 1.0 percent of GDP and is nearly
45 percent larger than the RMSE for total outlays. Not
surprisingly, the projection errors by source are
much larger at the five-year horizon. Nevertheless, it
remains the case that receipts appear to be more dif-
ficult to project than outlays. The relative ability to
project receipts and outlays appears to equalize
somewhat as the projection horizon lengthens.
Table 3 also decomposes receipts and outlays by
their major categories.15 Individual income tax
receipts are the most difficult component of receipts
to project at both horizons. In terms of total outlays,
discretionary spending projection errors are the
smallest at the one-year horizon but are the largest
at the five-year horizon.16
The reader is once again cautioned that these
results should not be taken as criticism of the CBO
per se. It is very doubtful that any other organization
or government agency could do significantly better.
Rather, these results point out how inherently
difficult it is to project the future, especially given
CBO Projection Error Statistics: Deficit/Surplus, Total Outlays, and Total Receipts
(Percent of GDP)
Average RMS 
Series error MAE error Minimum Maximum
One-year-ahead projection errors
Deficit/surplus 0.05 1.05 1.31 –2.19 3.03
Total receipts 0.03 0.75 0.99 –1.79 2.83
Individual income taxes –0.08 0.49 0.63 –1.40 1.30
Corporate taxes 0.10 0.22 0.28 –0.37 0.64
Social insurance taxes 0.00 0.26 0.46 –1.93 0.52
Total outlays 0.25 0.56 0.69 –0.83 1.46
Mandatory 0.09 0.55 0.67 –1.32 1.27
Discretionary 0.07 0.17 0.20 –0.15 0.41
Five-year-ahead projection errors
Deficit/surplus 1.97 4.10 5.28 –4.94 12.13
Total receipts 1.55 2.41 3.35 –2.78 8.86
Individual income taxes 1.16 1.65 2.28 –1.93 6.11
Corporate taxes 0.35 0.71 0.91 –0.79 2.00
Social insurance taxes 0.21 0.57 0.68 –1.60 1.13
Total outlays –0.43 2.22 2.74 –6.31 3.67
Mandatory –0.09 0.70 0.84 –1.66 1.30
Discretionary 0.81 0.83 1.13 –0.12 2.37
Table 3
15 Caution must be used with respect to the components of total out-
lays because we only have a consistent breakdown of total outlays
into mandatory and discretionary outlays back to FY 1983.
16 See Auerbach (1999) for an analysis of CBO and OMB revenue fore-
casts.18 MARCH/APRIL 2001
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that the no-change assumption with respect to tax
and spending programs will eventually be violated.17
Are the CBO’s Projections Biased? 
The data in Table 3 show that the CBO’s pro-
jections are unbiased at the one-year horizon. The
average projection error is 0.05 percent of GDP,
and it not significantly different from zero at the
5 percent significance level. At the five-year hori-
zon, however, the average projection error is very
large—nearly 2 percent of GDP. Moreover, the aver-
age error is significantly larger than zero at the 5
percent level. The average error is about half of
the range in the actual surpluses and deficits: 1.4
percent to –6 percent of GDP. Because the CBO is
projecting a surplus through 2005 that is equal to
about 3.25 percent of GDP, making a correction for
the average bias suggests a bias-corrected project-
ed surplus that is only 1.25 percent of GDP.
THE SOURCES OF PROJECTION
ERRORS
What accounts for the inaccuracies in the
CBO’s projections and why are they biased? Some
insight into the answer to these questions can be
obtained by looking at the possible sources of pro-
jection errors. Projection errors are typically classi-
fied into three types. The first is called legislative
errors. As mentioned previously, budget projec-
tions are made under the assumption that current
government program levels and the current tax
structure will remain unchanged over the projec-
tion period. This assumption will almost certainly
be false, especially at the five-year horizon. It is
virtually certain that there will be legislative
changes.
For example, the CBO estimated that the FY
2000 budget passed by Congress and signed into
law by the President will reduce the estimated sur-
plus by about $127 billion over the 2000-09
horizon. Much of this additional spending has
been classified as “emergency” legislation. The
combined “emergency” appropriations for FY
1999-2000 totaled $65.5 billion, roughly 60
percent of the previous eight years combined. But
unlike the appropriations for Desert Storm, the
1993 Great Flood, Hurricane Andrew, and the 1994
Northridge (Los Angeles) earthquake, which were
largely passed through traditional supplemental
legislation, the bulk of the emergency appropria-
tions in the FY 1999-2000 budgets were regular
rather than supplemental. According to the CBO,
regular appropriations classified as emergency
spending have totaled $58.6 billion since 1990,
with nearly 90 percent of that spending occurring
in FY 1999-2000.18 By contrast, supplemental
emergency appropriations totaled just $14.7 billion
in FY 1999-2000. In effect, then, Congress and the
Administration have circumvented the discretion-
ary budget caps that were put into place during the
1990 Budget Enforcement Act by increasingly clas-
sifying appropriations as emergency spending.
Because the CBO could not have predicted this out-
come, it should not be held responsible for proj-
ections that miss the mark because of budgetary
chicanery. But this is exactly the point. In other
words, although the budget projection process is to
some extent biased against the CBO and thus po-
tentially leads to large subsequent projection errors,
legislative errors will occur because neither the
CBO nor anyone else is able to predict how much
of the public’s money Congress and the Adminis-
tration will choose to spend.
It is possible that policymakers create legisla-
tive errors by responding to budget projections. For
example, policymakers could enact changes in tax
rates and/or spending from current baseline levels 
in response to projections of a surplus or deficit.
This is not far fetched: Policymakers are debating
whether and by how much to increase government
spending and/or reduce taxes in anticipation of the
historically large projected surpluses.19
Furthermore, the interaction of the legislative
changes and budget projections can bias the CBO’s
projections. For example, assume that policymak-
ers, facing a projected surplus, decide to increase
spending and/or reduce taxes. The result will be a
smaller actual surplus than anticipated (or perhaps
a deficit). As a consequence, the projection error
(projection less actual) would be positive, i.e., the
projections will be biased upward. On the other
hand, if policymakers responded to projections of
a deficit by reducing spending, raising taxes, or
both, the average projection error would be nega-
tive.
17 The CBO (2000a, p. 97) readily acknowledges “considerable uncer-
tainty” in making its multiyear budget projections.
18 These appropriations exclude spending associated with Desert
Storm/Desert Shield operations.
19 For example, the House of Representatives has voted to repeal the
estate tax and the marriage penalty. In addition, the Congress
passed, and the President signed, legislation repealing the earnings
tax for senior citizens. On the spending side, there is considerable
discussion of creating a new Medicare entitlement program to pay
for prescription drugs for the elderly.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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Does such behavior account for the positive
average projection error in the CBO’s projections at
the five-year horizon? It seems unlikely: During
most of the period, the CBO was projecting a deficit
such that the bias created by the interaction of bud-
get projections and legislative changes should have
created a negative bias. Figure 5 shows, however,
that there were five years (1977-81) when the CBO
was projecting a surplus at the five-year horizon.
The actual experience was that the government ran
a deficit. Moreover, it is clear from Figure 5 that
these observations account for the positive bias
reported in Table 3 at the five-year horizon. Hence,
it is possible that the bias occurred because the
government increased spending or reduced taxes
in response to projections of a budget surplus five
years out. Another and perhaps more likely expla-
nation is that, like most forecasters at the time, the
CBO failed to forecast the rapid run-up in oil prices,
the subsequent acceleration in inflation, and the
recessions in 1980 and 1981-82.
Even if tax and spending programs are un-
changed, the projections are not likely to materialize
because they are tethered to the CBO’s forecasts of
major macroeconomic variables. The CBO repor-
tedly does not base its economic forecast on a sin-
gle model, but rather uses a series of models, ad 
hoc judgments, and input from private sector fore-
casters and economists.20 For near-term budget
projections, the CBO makes forecasts of the growth
rate of real GDP, consumer price index (CPI) infla-
tion, the unemployment rate, and the 3-month and
10-year Treasury rates. For longer-term projections
(five years or more), however, the economy’s un-
derlying growth rate (which is largely determined
by growth of labor productivity and population
growth) plays the dominant role. These forecasts
are referred to as economic assumptions. According-
ly, budget projection errors that arise because of
erroneous economic forecasts are referred to as
economic assumption errors. The magnitude of
these errors depends on the sensitivity of the
budget projections to these economic assumptions
and whether assumption errors for different macro-
economic variables offset or reinforce each other.
Finally, even if there were no changes in
spending and tax programs and the CBO’s econo-
mic assumptions materialized exactly, projections
could still be wrong because of technical errors.
Government expenditures and tax revenues vary
with their source. For example, tax revenue broadly
depends on not only the growth rate of the
economy but also the relative size of corporate
profits, the growth rate of personal income, and
the extent to which individuals turn paper profits
into cash (capital gains), to mention but a few.
Hence, the CBO makes forecasts not only of key
macroeconomic variables but also of many var-
iables upon which taxes and expenditures depend.
Hence, even if the CBO’s forecasts of key economic
variables were 100 percent accurate, its budget
projections could be in error because it got the
details wrong.21
There were two important examples of this
phenomenon in recent years. The first was the
welfare reform legislation passed in 1996, which
reduced spending on income security and food
stamps. The second was the unexpected boom in
equity prices which, in spite of the reductions in
long-term capital gains taxes in 1998, led to a
surge of individual income tax revenues.22
Another “detail” that may have contributed to a
one-time projection error was the change in the con-
struction of the CPI beginning in 1995. By 1999, the
methodological changes in the construction of the
CPI reduced the annual inflation rate by about 0.6
percentage points compared with the methodology
employed to calculate the 1994 inflation rate.
According to the CBO’s analysis published in 1997, a
reduction of 1 percentage point per year in the
growth of the CPI would reduce the deficit by $653
billion over the 1998-2007 projection period.
Overall, because many of these components,
such as capital gains taxes, are notoriously difficult
to forecast, one would not be surprised to find that
technical errors account for a large proportion of the
projection errors. Of course, economic assumption
errors and technical errors need not be independent.
For example, if economic growth is stronger than
anticipated, corporate profits or capital gains may
be stronger than anticipated as well.
20 See CBO (1998).
21 Note that these are all economic variables and, to that extent, the
distinction between technical errors and economic assumption
errors is somewhat blurred. See Altig (2000) for a discussion of this
point.
22 Regarding the latter, see Kasten, Weiner, and Woodward (1999). The
increased revenue from the surge in capital gains might be less
important than the resulting change in the distribution of income—
that is, if proportionately more people are shifted into a higher
(marginal) tax bracket.20 MARCH/APRIL 2001
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The Relative Importance of Legislative,
Economic, and Technical Errors
The CBO’s analysis of the relative magnitude
of legislative, economic, and technical errors is
presented in Table 4. The CBO estimated that legis-
lative errors account for about 35 percent of the
average absolute projection error at the five-year
horizon. They estimated that technical errors are
the largest, accounting for over 40 percent of the
average absolute projection error. Errors in fore-
casting the general economic outlook were the
smallest at the five-year horizon, accounting for
about 25 percent of the total projection error. Altig
(2000) notes, however, that there is a close corres-
pondence between technical errors and economic
assumption errors because the former are the
details related to the latter.
Projection errors arising from economic fore-
cast errors have been relatively large in recent years.
In 1999 and 2000, the CBO estimates that economic
assumption errors accounted for 41 percent and 57
percent of the total absolute change in the projected
10-year surplus in 1999 and 2000, respectively.
What Caused the Change in the
Budget Outlook?
Projections of relatively large unified budget
surpluses over the next decade would have been
viewed as highly implausible as recently as five
years ago. Indeed, projections of large and rising
federal budget deficits were the norm as late as
January 1997. Figure 6 shows CBO’s 10-year sur-
plus/deficit projections for each year from 1994
through 2000, along with the revenue and outlay
projections over the same periods. It was not until
the federal government experienced its first surplus
in 1998 that the CBO began projecting a persistent
surplus. Prior to 1998, the CBO projected a persis-
tent deficit. Not only did the projections shift from
deficits to surpluses in 1998, but the slope of the
projection line went from being negative to being
positive (i.e., the CBO went from projecting larger
deficits over time to projecting larger surpluses over
time).
What accounts for this dramatic turnaround in
the budget outlook? Some have suggested that the
outlook changed because of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93).23 This legisla-
tion ostensibly provided for $433 billion in deficit
reduction over the five-year period spanning 1994-
98. This was to be accomplished through a combin-
ation of tax increases, reductions in mandatory
spending, and caps on discretionary spending. Altig
(2000) argues that the improved budget outlook is
not due to OBRA93 because similar legislation, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90),
promised—but failed to deliver—a $482 billion
reduction in the baseline deficit during the 1991-95
period. Despite OBRA90, Altig (2000) notes that the
deficit increased by $6 billion relative to levels pro-
jected prior to the bill’s passage.
There is little question, however, that the marked
improvement in the economy’s performance be-
tween 1996 and 2000 has been a decisive factor in
explaining the dramatic improvement in the federal
government’s budget.24 Consider the analysis of the
CBO’s baseline projections between 1996 and 2000
for the period 2000-06 in Table 5. First, there was a
Decomposition of CBO Deficit/Surplus Projection Errors: Five Years Ahead (Billions of Dollars)
Forecast error due to:
Economic Technical Legislative Total error Total absolute error
1990 Baseline –82.54 –163.38 199.70 –46.22 445.617
1991 Baseline 10.77 –151.60 89.92 –50.91 252.296
1992 Baseline 57.83 8.43 137.91 204.17 204.165
1993 Baseline 126.75 170.44 129.54 426.73 426.730
1994 Baseline 160.05 178.47 –9.68 328.84 348.199
Absolute error (sum) 437.94 672.32 566.75 862.61 1,677.01
Percentage of total 26.11 40.09 33.80 100.00
absolute error
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, unpublished data.
Table 4
23 The 2000 Economic Report of the President makes this claim. See p. 52.
24 Altig (2000) also stresses this argument.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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marked change in the economic assumptions used
by the CBO in their projections between 1996 and
2000. As other private forecasters did, the CBO
boosted its forecast of actual and potential GDP
growth; it also scaled back its assumption for CPI
inflation and for the unemployment rate.
Faster economic growth means larger tax
revenues, whereas a lower unemployment rate leads
to reductions in mandatory spending for unemploy-
ment compensation, welfare outlays, and the like. As
line 3 in Table 5 shows, nearly all of the improve-
ment in the outlook for revenues stemmed from a
greater than expected surge in individual income
taxes—the area where the CBO’s revenue projections
have been the least accurate at the five-year horizon.
Moreover, individual income tax revenue is projected
to be higher by 1.2 percent of GDP in the 2000
projections compared with the 1996 projections.
On the outlay side, most of the improvement
comes in mandatory expenditures, which are project-
ed to be 2.3 percent lower as a percentage of GDP in
2000 compared with 1996. The other major improve-
ment on the outlay side is net interest. This reflects
the reductions in inflation (which, all else equal, re-
duces nominal interest rates) and the reduction in the
public’s holding of government debt that have already
occurred and are projected to occur. Perhaps more
important, the evidence in Table 5 suggests that the
improved economic outlook may be largely responsi-
ble for the improved long-term outlook as well.
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CONCLUSION
Projecting the path of federal government
receipts and expenditures—and thus the unified
budget surplus or deficit—several years into the
future is a daunting task. This is why the CBO cau-
tions users on the highly uncertain nature of their
long-term budget projections. Moreover, budget
projections provide a method of analyzing alterna-
tive budget proposals: they are not intended to be
used as forecasts. Nevertheless, policymakers and
the public often treat them as such. Indeed, there
are many proposals to cut taxes or increase spend-
ing based on these projections. Our analysis of the
CBO’s record of projecting budget surpluses and
deficits at the five-year horizon suggests that the
public and policymakers should be wary of chang-
ing spending and tax programs based on projections
of the surplus or deficit. Specifically, there is no sta-
tistically significant relationship between projec-
tions and experience. There is no reason to sus-
pect that things are different now.
In addition, past projections were biased in the
direction of under-projecting the size of the deficit.
Moreover, the size of the bias is very large—nearly 2
percent of GDP. If the current projections are biased
to a similar degree and policymakers choose to alter
current tax and spending programs based on these
projections, it is possible that the projected surpluses
will never materialize.
Even if historical regularities fail to hold and leg-
islators decide to forgo sizable future income tax
reductions and expenditure increases, the budget
surpluses that are currently projected to prevail over
the medium term are likely to evaporate over the
long term because of the retirement of the baby
boom generation. The trust fund surpluses, which
account for the bulk of the current projected unified
budget surpluses, will not be available after about
2015. When this happens, the government will have
to resume borrowing from the public, unless there
are surpluses in other areas of the government.
Given this reality and the likelihood that actual
Regime Shift? Change in Baseline Budget Projections and Economic Assumptions: 1996 vs. 2000 
(Percent of GDP)
Tax revenues Outlays
Individual Corporate Social Total  tax Total 
income income insurance revenues Discretionary Mandatory Net interest outlays
Change in budget assumptions
1996 Baseline projection, 8.5 2.2 6.7 18.9 6.8 12.1 3.1 21.1
1996-99 average
Actual outcome, 9.2 2.2 6.6 19.5 6.6 10.9 2.9 19.4
1996-99 average
Projection error –0.7 0.0 0.1 –0.6 0.2 1.2 0.2 1.7
1996 Baseline projection, 8.6 1.8 6.7 18.5 6.1 13.1 3.1 21.5
2000-06 average
2000 Baseline projection, 9.8 1.8 6.8 20.0 6.1 10.8 1.8 17.9
2000-06 average
Difference: 1996 vs. 2000 1.2 0.0 0.1 1.5 0.0 –2.3 –1.3 –3.6
Memorandum (1970-95)
Average 8.2 2.1 5.9 18.0 9.7 10.4 2.3 21.2
High 9.3 (1981) 3.2 (1970) 6.7 (1991) 19.6 (1981) 11.9 (1970) 11.9 (1983) 3.3 (1991) 23.5 (1983)
Low 7.6 (1976) 1.1 (1983) 4.4 (1970) 17.2 (1976) 7.5 (1995) 7.1 (1970) 1.3 (1973) 18.7 (1974)
Growth of
Growth of potential  CPI   Unemployment
real GDP GDP inflation rate
Change in economic assumptions
Date of baseline projections
May 1996 (1996 to 2006) 2.1 2.2 3.0 6.0
January 2000 (1999 to 2010) 2.9 3.1 2.5 4.8
NOTE: Averages of fiscal years indicated.
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surpluses will be much smaller than projected, we
believe that the concern expressed in some quart-
ers—that there will not be a market for risk-free
government debt—is significantly overstated. Even if
the budget projections were reasonably accurate, the
demise of this market likely would be only
temporary.
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On January 31, 2001, the Congressional Budget
Office released its baseline budget projections for
fiscal years 2002 to 2011.1 Consistent with the
theme of recent reports, the Agency once again
revised upward its projected cumulative budget
surplus during the coming decade.  According to
the new projections, unified budget surpluses for
the fiscal years 2002 to 2011 are expected to total
just over $5.6 trillion. The outgoing Clinton Admin-
istration’s final baseline (current services)
projection is slightly less optimistic, but not by
much, totaling roughly $5 trillion. These figures are
substantially larger than a year earlier, when the
CBO was projecting a cumulative $3.2 trillion sur-
plus and the OMB (baseline) was projecting a $2.5
trillion surplus, and modestly greater than last
year’s mid-year estimates (see Table 1, page 12).
In part, the larger surpluses reflect the addition
of an extra “out year” (2011) that is considerably
larger than the surplus for the year that was
dropped (2001). For example, the CBO’s projected
surplus for 2011, $889 billion, is $608 billion more
than the projected 2001 surplus.  The factor that is
most responsible for the upward revision, however,
is a more optimistic assessment of the economy’s
potential output growth. Both the CBO and the
OMB now project that real GDP growth will average
slightly more than 3 percent during the next 10
years, roughly a quarter of a percentage point more
than last year’s average projected growth. Faster
economic growth, accordingly, is expected to boost
projected revenues significantly. Comparing this
year’s 10-year projections for fiscal years 2001 to
2010 with last year’s, the CBO estimates that cumu-
lative revenues will be nearly 9 percent larger,
while outlays are only expected to be 1.5 percent
higher.
Since this article was prepared, the economy
slowed appreciably during the second half of 2000,
and most forecasters—including the CBO—
expected its growth in 2001 to be about a
percentage point below its potential growth. Since
most forecasters assume the economy will bounce
back quickly to a rate near or slightly above its
trend growth, the effect on the cumulative surplus
is expected to be minor. Moreover, the CBO ran an
alternative simulation which assumes a recession
in 2001 of approximately the same magnitude as
the 1990-91 recession. In that scenario, the cumu-
lative surplus for the period 2002 to 2011 is cut
from $5.61 trillion to $5.48 trillion.
A more important development, which is in
part a consequence of the projected surpluses, is
the likelihood of expansionary fiscal policy.  In
early February 2001, the Bush Administration
announced that it was sending to Congress a
proposal that, among other items, reduces
marginal tax rates, doubles the child tax credit, and
reduces the marriage penalty.  Though specifics of
the proposal were not available as this article went
to press, commentary from Administration officials
suggests the total reduction in tax revenues would
amount to $1.6 trillion over a 10-year horizon (the
timing of the tax cuts was yet to be decided).
Generally speaking, an expansionary fiscal
policy reduces tax revenues. The Bush package,
however, includes reductions in marginal tax rates,
which could enhance the economy’s growth
potential by increasing the incentives to save and
invest—thereby boosting capital formation and
productivity growth.  Consequently, should it be
adopted, the ultimate effect of the President’s
package on the budget is difficult to predict.
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1 Congress of the United States. The Budget and Economic Outlook:
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